In 1975-77, the present author published a three-volume life of Furubotn from 1890 to 1945. It attempts a general chronological presentation of the mainstream of his life, but emphazises his relations with Moscow (after 1923). It was not intended as a traditional scholarly account. The main theme is that Furubotn underwent a process of gradual emancipation from the centre of Communism in Moscow, in particular after the prosecution of Bukharin in 1938. The author has since developed this view further in three articles about the NKP after 1945, two of them accounts of the showdown in 1949 (1isted in the bibliography). Where the coverage of the 1890 to 1945 period in the present dissertation is concerned, it presents source material not available in the earlier biography, including the NKP's microfilms covering 1923-35, as well as asking new questions.

Per Selle

The first comprehensive work since Terje Halvorsen's was Per Selle's Norges Kommunistiske parti 1945-1950, Oslo and Bergen 1983. It is more concerned with electoral behaviour than with politics, and in Norwegian terms is a pioneering work in the field of election ecology. It stands out from previous studies of the NKP in containing discussions of methodology in a comparative perspective and in presenting models.

Selle relates his study of election ecology to a context of earlier discussions of the NKP in the period in question. He, too, considers the part played by Furubotn and finds it difficult to credit that the Russians had nothing to do with Furubotn's exclusion from the NKP in 1949.(59) Whereas many previous authors had taken Furubotn's official fidelity to Moscow literally, Selle takes a more questioning line:(60)

At a time when absolute loyalty was insisted upon, it would have been strange indeed if Moscow had not made its wishes known. Besides, with Moscow behind you, you could adopt fairly extreme methods, while others had to tread more warily. In 1950, a Communist Party which failed to acknowledge Moscow's leading role would have been inconceivable. That is the perspective in which the Furubotn wing, too, must be viewed. A Communist leader had to fight constantly to retain Moscow's favour. Another sign of that is that at times there could be quite a gap between his public statements and what he really believed. To establish what Communists believe at any given time, it is not enough to read official party documents. That Furubotn gradually came to voice the strongest public support for Stalin does not necessarily make him the most ardent Stalinist. It may simply be an indication that he had understood, better than most of those who have analysed it afterwards, what life was really like in this movement. It can equally well be interpreted as Furubotn's attempt to seize the initiative in the struggle in the party, a struggle which he knew that only the person ultimately supported by Moscow would win.

In her study of T. H. Aschehoug, Vitenskap og virkelighet (science and reality), Oslo 1975, Anne-Lise Seip makes a similar methodological point on page 14: ``Arguments are more often chosen for tactical reasons, and are not intended to be the most correct expression possible of one's thoughts. Both this and other sources of error must be taken into account when statements are being interpreted and matters of basic importance to the speaker are being distinguished''.