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Løvlien and Furubotn might disagree on many issues, but at the national conference in 1946, in a discussion of the peaceful road, Løvlien presented what almost amounted to a summary of Furubotn's ideas. He said that the NKP alone could not issue any guarantees, but that there were certain conditions which would have to be fulfilled:(81)

    1) ``reactionary forces'' among the bourgeoisie must adhere to democratic parliamentary rules
    2) the administration, army and police must be democratised
    3) economic life must be democratised
    4) the working class must ``in practice become the bearer of the interests of the whole...nation, realise the unity of the labour movement, and (form) a democratic assembly which can isolate the leading centre of monopoly capitalism and systematically reduce monopoly capitalism's power''
    5) no intervention by imperialist powers must take place.

It would be incorrect though, to maintain against this background that Furubotn was unduly optimistic about NKP's chances of assuming power in the near future. There is a clear indication of doubt in the single word which constantly recurs in NKP documents and in Furubotn's formulations: the ``possibility'' of a peaceful transition. The NKP wished to appear as a reliable democratic alternative in 1945, and preferred not to show that it was keeping the traditional Marxist-Leninist power model in reserve. It was important to Furubotn that promising new possibilities had arisen with the parliamentary situation in 1945 and he wanted to make aggressive use of them: (82)

    The bourgeois attitude to strikes: illegal. We Marxists disregarded that. What is new is that we can now advance on bourgeois grounds. The situation of the bourgeoisie is that they are afraid of how we may use their constitution, and wish that it contained less democratic articles.

Summary
It is easy to show how Furubotn supported the international communist line after the war. No other longstanding NKP leader identified himself with it to the same extent. He emphasised making special Norwegian characteristics a main issue in the NKP. He highlighted Norwegian traditions of independence and freedom. We see him making ideology another major issue, violently attacking the party's pre-war policy, and voicing severe self-criticism. His assault left the party with little credit: he called it primitive and sectarian, said that it was politically and ideologically bankrupt in 1945, and regarded the old party leaders as more or less incompetent to deal with current issues.

Small wonder that so radical a turnaround seemed a provocation, to the party veterans in particular. Furubotn can be seen running into trouble with them almost from the beginning, for instance when they boycotted the study and refresher courses which he initiated for senior party officers.

For a Communist leader in a small country to feel entitled to revise Marxism-Leninism as independently as Furubotn did was remarkable enough; but it was even more provocative of him to distance himself like he did from the old party leaders who had been approved of by Moscow. Although Furubotn did not challenge such basic principles of dogma as friendship with the Soviet Union, Marxist constitutional theory, the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., his efforts to build up a national ideology in the NKP might in the long run prove a threat to the ideological and political leadership of Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party.

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