It was not easy for Communist leaders to stress independent ideological thinking, because to do so could get them into trouble with Moscow and as a practical consequence ideology had alow priority in the Communist parties: they had it handed down to them from the ideological centre in Moscow.(26) Where the ideology was concerned which he could apply to conditions in Norway, Furubotn was not so passive or reliant on outside sources. The NKP of 1945 was practically devoid of ``Marxist science'' in a Norwegian context.(27) It had made no study of class divisions in its own country and no survey had been carried out of Norwegian social life or the impact on it of the outside world.(28) There was a great deal of work there for the NKP to do, Furubotn felt, and he got the central party machine to prepare large quantities of material on various aspects of Norwegian society. He demanded quality in this work, saying it must bear the stamp of ``information, objectivity, and more objectivity again''.(29)

This would be a difficult task, Furubotn argued, because the Norwegian labour movement had been so backward in this field. The movement had typically brought to the fore phrasemongers, who were ``virtuoso talkers although their thoughts lacked a basis in fact''. Their main objective was applause. The NKP would now have to bring forth ``scientists'', whose contributions would be based on real work.(30)

Self-criticism also featured in his campaign: he said he had been one of those who spoke at the drop of a hat -- without having facts to build upon. ``I have been gassing on for 20-30 years without basing what I was going on about on historical developments.''(31) Furubotn believed he could see in this attitude the origins of a characteristic sectarianism in the Norwegian labour movement as a whole: ``...this peculiar ideology, which instead of building upon facts turns this way and that from day to day''.

Furubotn's constant theme was that the medicine against the sectarianism of the Norwegian labour movement was to raise the ideological level. How to bring that about in the NKP just after the war was another matter. There was a vacuum in the party in 1945. Several of its most prominent leaders had died at their posts during the war, leaving a group of diehards who were steeped in the Comintern tradition and what Furubotn regarded as a sectarian pre-war policy. He rejected and spoke out against what he saw as their tendency to equate party seniority with being well schooled in Marxism.(32)

There were too few of the old guard to fill all the vacant offices in the large new party, and besides Furubotn did not think they were up to meeting the requirements of a new age. Towards the end of the war he was outspoken enough to say that the only solution to the problem lay in finding ``new, more fruitful and creative people''.(33) After the war, he had assembled around him a group of young but well-seasoned and tried resistance leaders. They were equipped to renew the party, but in his opinion lacked ideological experience. So there was in effect a manpower shortage in the party in 1945. To rectify this, the NKP started a party school, which concentrated on ideological topics, with leading party members, mainly Furubotn's men, as lecturers.

Furubotn regarded Marxist philosophy as a tool for research and scientific thought, but warned against pure theory:(34)

If we forget theory and limit ourselves entirely to practice, we shall need bigger and bigger shoes and smaller and smaller hats. If, on the other hand, we become dry theoreticians, bury ourselves in abstract theory, we shall become like a fruit tree that freezes in winter -- and bears no fruit....