As we see, then, the NKP statutes conferred no distinct formally encoded advantages on Furubotn as general secretary from 1945 to 1949. His power in 1945 stemmed from Communist custom and from his authority as general secretary during the period of wartime resistance. The strong inner tensions in the party leadership meant that his position as party leader in 1945 was less secure than it might appear at first glance. His future as leader of the NKP would very much depend on how successfully he could handle the inner party unrest.

``A storm is brewing''

In July 1945, the NKP leaders assembled for a meeting of what was called the expanded central committee. At the end of September, and extraordinary party conference was held in Oslo. One might have expected disagreements to emerge on either occasion, but if they did they left no enduring trace. Newspaper reports leave no doubt that the Furubotn wing was in charge.(80) The only noticeable disagreements related to some uneasiness over the merger negotiations being conducted between the Labour Party and the NKP, to which we shall return in a separate chapter. A disagreement, confined to the top of the party, also arose over the part played by the NKP during the dramatic years of 1940 and 1941. Adam Egede-Nissen, who was still party chairman, attacked Furubotn for criticising the party's passivity at that time, when the European Communist parties were still towing the Non-Aggression line. Egede-Nissen called it a serious mistake to criticise the policy adopted by the party at that stage, and was supported by Emil Løvlien.(81) The clash was echoed in the quarterly periodical Politikken published by Gunnar Lund, who was one of the old guard of party leaders (he was born in 1893), and had among other things been chairman of the ``Friends of the Soviet Union'' and for a time in the 1930`s in charge of the NKP's farmers' organisation.(92) He described his publication as an independent Communist periodical. In it he maintained that in July 1945 the central committee had judged the NKP of 1940-41 ``somewhat incorrectly. The criticism of errors and weaknesses was too severe''.(83) Though far from negligible, this disagreement went unnoticed by the dailies, and the Furubotn majority at the top of the party did nothing more about it. They did, however, attempt to create a single party organisation for the administrative staff in the central party organisation and its main newspaper Friheten. This provoked vehement protests, from Egede-Nissen and Løvlien in particular. Løvlien argued that there was nothing like it in other Communist parties.(84) They regarded the proposal as an attempt by the Furubotn wing to secure control at the top of the party. According to notes taken by a Furubotn supporter in the party secretariat, Furubotn's opponents were ``perfectly aware'' that if this new party organisation was formed it would ``weaken their undermining activities'', which was why they fought against it ``tooth and nail''.(85) These notes show how deep the divisions at the head of the NKP had already become but they did not become generally known until the conference in 1946. Before the conference, the Labour newspaper Arbeiderbladet wrote:(86)

It has been clear for some time that a storm is brewing in the Communist Party. Nor are the sharp personal disagreements among the party's highest leaders any secret. Or that differences of opinion on political questions, primarily of a tactical nature, have led to the formation of cliques, while strong currents and counter-currents have begun to flow. So far, however, this unrest has remained dormant.

The NKP secretariat attempted to refute these reports.(87) The party leadership clearly wanted calm to prevail before the conference. But Arbeiderbladet stuck to its version, which today appears to have been close to the mark.