The new Communist line adopted in 1945 was not only a product of a general analysis of the relative strengths of capitalism and socialism. Its principal source lay in the Soviet Union's interests as a great power, which consisted roughly speaking of retaining the territories won in the war. Evidence of this can be seen in the discussions between Churchill and Stalin which resulted in the so-called percentage agreement. This was the secret outcome of negotiations between Stalin and Churchill in Moscow in October 1944, at which the two national leaders divided Europe into spheres of interest, at least until victory over Hitler had been won.(6) The arrangement applied particularly to areas which might prove bones of contention between the two wartime allies, such as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece, where their interests as great powers were specified in terms of percentages. It was built into the agreement that what was traditionally Western Europe should be the sphere of the Western powers; in return, Stalin was to have a relatively free hand in the East. In October 1944, the armed might of the Soviet Union was formidable, and this was Stalin's trump card but he also held other strong cards in Western Europe: the Communist parties. In France and Italy, especially, they were strong enough to think of winning power. This was known to the Western powers and was a cause of great concern and fear in their bourgeois circles. The talks in Moscow were Churchill's solution to the problem. This emerges for instance in the exchanges concerning the Italian Communist party. Churchill got Stalin to promise to keep the Communists sufficiently in check to prevent speculations about possible Communist control of Italy.(7)

When Hitler had finally been defeated in 1945, Stalin wanted the percentage agreement to remain in force.(8) That would secure Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. To bring it about, good relations would have to be maintained with the Western powers, something that would bring the added advantage of favourable conditions for rebuilding the war-torn Soviet Union. Stalin knew that the Western powers were aware of the Soviet dominance of the Communist parties, despite the formal dissolution of the Comintern. Should the Communist parties prove a disruptive element in Western post-war societies, they would weaken the Soviet Union's chances of maintaining reasonably good relations with the Western powers. Besides, the Soviet Union wished to prevent the Western powers from confronting it as a block after the war; divisions in the West would be useful. Stalin thus wanted to see the emergence of a strong and independent France that would counter-balance Anglo-American dominance in Western Europe and at the same time provide a guarantee against future German aggression. As the West German historian Wilfried Loth has put it, it cost Stalin little to let the French Communists do their share of the work to this purpose.(9) France was much weakened in 1945. A policy of co-operation would both help to preserve the system and strengthen France as a great power. The new policy accordingly served the Soviet Union's current great power and security interests.

This general framework for Communist policies in Western Europe just after 1945 left scope for relatively national and independent initiatives on the part of the Communist parties, provided they presented no challenge to the Soviet Union's security interests. This was a new situation that suited Furubotn well.