It is, however, in the nature of these questions that no documentation can be brought to bear from the sources available. The hypothesis cannot be rejected, nor is it necessary to do so. Only further research in the event may be able to answer the question of whether the international factor was what triggered the final crisis. But irrespective of the parts, small or large, played by the other parties in provoking a ``showdown'', this does not affect our conclusion as to the underlying cause: that it was an internal Norwegian struggle, and not the outcome of a conflict introduced into the party from outside.

In an article in Kontrast in 1973, Halvorsen somewhat modified this conclusion:(16)

It is perfectly possible that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, played a significant part in the crisis - but it cannot be proved.

Terje Halvorsen's dissertation is a workmanlike empirical investigation of what actually happened within the Norwegian Communist Party during the 1949 showdown. On the underlying causes for the showdown and split it is a little less satisfactory, because Halvorsen largely concentrates on a short period of time (1949), and because the historical background is brief (1945-49) and lacking in any extensive study of sources. The latter is probably one reason why Halvorsen is less than clear in his assessment of party leader Furubotn and his relations with Moscow - a central issue which he ought to have clarified before coming to any conclusion about the causes of the schism. As Halvorsen saw it in his 1970 Master's dissertation, a certain degree of independence from Moscow could perhaps be attributed to Furubotn ``if one looks less at intentions than at results''.(17) Halvorsen conducts no separate analysis of Furubotn's intentions, however, beyond what can be found in public statements and articles, and one may doubt whether such an approach is adequate in this field. A further objection to his work is that he draws a number of his conclusions in areas where, as he admits in an article in 1979, there has been no research: ``Where the political practice of the NKP and the Furubotn wing during this period is concerned, no systematic contribution has as yet been made.'' (18) Closer study of long-term factors may have consequences for the assessment of short-term causes which figures so prominently in Halvorsen's dissertation. Since Halvorsen found it unnecessary to look for foreign interference in the party conflict of 1949, the question will have to be made the subject for further research.

Trond Gilberg

The Norwegian-born social scientist Trond Gilberg discusses the history of the NKP in a comparative study of the Norwegian and the Soviet parties, The Soviet Communist Party and Scandinavian Communism - The Norwegian Case, Oslo 1973. In contrast to Halvorsen, Gilberg dates the turnaround in the NKP's postwar policy to early 1946. Unlike a number of younger Norwegian historians, he does not talk about the party's social democratic line, but claims that from 1946 on it moved from ``national cooperation to more opposition along traditional lines...''.(19) The reason Gilberg gives for this view is that the party had been forced to give way to the Norwegian Labour Party on issue after issue immediately after the liberation: (20)

It was no wonder that the NKP leadership, frustrated and outmanoeuvred in the struggle for control over the working class, turned to opposition and animosity.