In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Furubotn no doubt believed that on the whole the interests of the Comintern coincided with Norwegian interests. But that did not mean that he agreed with the Comintern or the Russians on every political issue. A number of episodes in the NKP leadership testify to that. He said in debate that the NKP must not be allowed to become ``a party with bureaucratic church-like discipline''.(56) He was criticised for having opposed the Comintern(57) and for being an old syndicalist.(58) It is interesting to note Arvid G. Hansen's attack in November 1925, when Furubotn had spoken of groups within the party which were hostile to the Comintern. Hansen claimed that Furubotn had been working ``systematically'' for party results which would oblige ``the Comintern to revise its view of our party''.(59) The point here is that Hansen charged Furubotn with a kind of systematic opposition to the Comintern, based on keeping quiet about the points on which he disagreed, while at the same time confronting the organisation with ``faits accomplis''.(60) Hansen believed that by such methods Furubotn was seeking to force the Comintern to shift its policy in respect of the NKP in the direction Furubotn wanted.

NKP records from the 1920s do not always show Furubotn as the strong and uncompromising leader that he is reputed to have been. At times he was uncertain and vacillating.(61) The point for him was to keep the NKP's policies as independent as possible. As his opponent, the NKP leader Leif O. Foss, remarked in 1975: ``Furubotn was an individualist in many respects, and often expressed views that he was alone in holding''.(62) Foss was speaking of the Furubotn of the late 1920s.

The period 1928-29 thus becomes crucial, with its introduction of the so-called class-against-class policy and the theory that social democrats were social fascists. In the main, Furubotn accepted this change of course, but there is reason to believe the claim he made in later years that he wrote a letter to the Comintern in 1929 in which he was critical of the extreme trade union policy which the Comintern adopted as formulated in the so-called Strasbourg theses.(63) According to these theses, NKP members were for instance obliged to accept non-union participants in labour disputes and strikes on a par with organized members, a principle which was directly contrary to Norwegian union traditions; another point was that women and children should be drawn into dangerous confrontations between workers and the authorities. It seems reasonable to suppose that as an old union man Furubotn would have reacted against such an abnormal strike strategy, which was also a cause of concern in the NKP leadership leading to clashes of opinion.(64)

Furubotn also claimed to have resigned as Chairman of the NKP when the Comintern Secretariat labelled his criticism ``reformist'', i.e. moderate. He did not want to be responsible as party leader for the new party line, he said.(65) The NKP's microfilm, which was made available for research purposes in 1979, does not shed much light on these circumstances. As Einhart Lorenz argues, there are factors that count for and others that weigh against Furubotn's own explanation. Lorenz, however, does not dismiss the idea that Furubotn was opposed to certain aspects of NKP policy, ``as his passivity in the party leadership might lead one to suppose''.(66)

Two considerations support Furubotn's version. One is that such a gesture would be in keeping with his marked individualism. The second is the political intensity and activity which was typical of him when he was fighting for things he believed in. His passivity around 1930 is a sign that he was out of step with Moscow. His own information on this score accordingly looks plausible. That he may not have given us all the reasons for his resignation is another matter. The elections to the Storting in 1930 were a disaster for the NKP. Its vote fell from 4% to 1.7%, there had been a loss of influence in the trade unions, and all in all the party had dwindled into being an almost powerless and static sect at the national level. Although the NKP's decline was part of an international trend, it was a personal defeat for Furubotn.(67) It had happened during his chairmanship, and he must have felt partly responsible for it. The inner clashes, the decline, the financial troubles in the party system must all have sapped his strength. The Strasbourg theses may have been the last straw. That he suffered a bout of alcoholism in 1930-31 is scarcely to be wondered at. Nor is it any surprise that the Comintern under the circumstances accepted his resignation, although it was a violation of Comintern laws.(68) He had not, after all, made his resignation public: changes could be made in the party leadership without undue drama.